This is an English translation of the first chapter of the book Porque te amo, Não Nascerás! (2009), or Nascituri te Salutant. I was given permission by Julio Cabrera in an email exchange with him to translate this chapter and upload it here. To access the original book in Portuguese, click here or here (alternative link).
Have a good read.
In this book, which could be called, with Schopenhauerian irony, The World as Birth and Procreation, the authors make an invitation to a joint reflection about these delicate issues. Both sincerely hope that the reading of this curious material (half philosophical essay, half novel) is of interest and benefit to its readers. And that it serves to make it explicit why they consider good and enlightened those people who say (or imagine to say) to their possible son or daughter: Because I love you, you will NOT be born!
Child number 12 (and third of co-authorship) of Julio Cabrera and number 1 (and probably the only one) of Thiago Lenharo di Santis, the book was born from the fortunate encounter of the authors, when Cabrera was a professor and when Thiago was an undergraduate student of philosophy in the UnB (University of Brasília), around the year 2006. They immediately discovered the remarkable coincidences in these lucid and unpopular thoughts, sharing a moral scandal before the coldness and detachment with which thousands of humans are dumped daily on planet Earth, just for the distraction of their parents or as a mere involuntary product.
She already has a job, a cell phone, a car, a house, and a husband. The only thing missing is a child!
I love my children intensely! An earlier and deeper love of which a father is exiled forever.
You were that graceful and worried little baby, a baby philosopher thinking before he was born.
My daughter playing with her kite, so carefree… She has no idea of everything that awaits her.
The experience of fatherhood and motherhood is extraordinary… For the parents.
This book can be seen in multiple ways, including as a proposal or a challenge for those who are willing to love their future children above all else, to love them beforehand with all generosity and protection possible, with a love so big that it is capable of putting the innocent in the privileged and safe place of non-being. A love that walks away from egoism and manipulation, and that finds, in the consideration and affection of the other, all the compassion and respect that a human being can deserve. A moral kind of love.
It is known that in ancient Rome the gladiators greeted the emperor with the saying Morituri te salutant, “those who will die (for your amusement) salute you”. Thus, in the same way, Nascituri te salutant says: “those who will be born (for your amusement) salute you”. And, even better, those who will not be born thank you.
To check for comments, critics and observations about the book and its authors, access the site: http://www.porqueteamonaonasceras.com.br/ (I have added a link from Wayback Machine on the highlighted text above, so that the readers can see what the site of the book looked like. The site is in Portuguese).
The authors dedicate this work to their beloved children.
May their non-birth be the most sublime proof of this love.
About being born and procreation: if “taking life” poses moral problems, why would not “giving life”?
(Julio Cabrera, under the pseudonym of Julio Cabrera).
Considerations about the decision to generate a new being
(by their point of view)
(Thiago Lenharo di Santis, under the pseudonym of Thiago di Diabolis).
Letters of abstention (to be born, or not to be born, that is the question)
(The brief and abrupt correspondence between the young negative philosopher Thiago di Diabolis and the austere teacher Julius von Kabra, possible descendant of Julio Cabrera).
This book, about the moral problem of procreation and birth (unpopular and almost untreated theme throughout the history of philosophy), was born of the natural and unplanned confluence of two thinkers, that of a young man who is entering philosophy and of an old thinker who is going out of it. This confluence does not mean agreement in each theme or resolution, but an intellectual and affective affinity on the subject, and a shared moral scandal in the face of the coldness and detachment with which thousands of humans are dumped daily on planet Earth only for our distraction or as an involuntary product.
The work purposely adopts an intermediate tone between philosophical argumentation and literary narrative. The first two chapters are expository and present the basic texts on the problem; the third is a literary resource (an unexpected exchange of letters) capable of provoking a discussion about the author’s predilection. The styles of the book are therefore varied, from the exercise of aphorism (chapter 1), essay (chapter 2) and epistolary style (chapter 3).
The illustrations contribute to the book being seen, in a way, as a product of pop philosophy, or “popular philosophy” (in the words of William James), in the sense of being accessible and interesting not only to broad and tolerant professional philosophers (we suppose optimistically that they exist), but also for anyone reflective and concerned about what goes on around.
In Brazilian terms, it could be seen, in an approximate way, as an attempt to write a Brazilwood philosophical text: “In the case of Alice’s story books… it is not about decorative illustrations, but of images intrinsically linked to the informative process of the text, thus providing a co-information at the visual level, with solidarity to the verbal message of the same text. The book of poems as conceived by Oswald… is part of this tradition” (Haroldo de Campos, Uma poética da radicalidade, In Andrade Oswald De, Pau Brasil. Editora Globo, São Paulo, 2003, 2ᵃ edição, p. 48/9).
Not only in its “concrete” or “physical” aspect would the present book be Oswaldian. Also in its option for aphorisms, the short and abrupt text, the frequent cuts, the blunt paragraphs, the drawings, photos and notes constantly interrupting the traditional flow of reading. Our experience, however, does not pretend to be poetic, but philosophical, in the sense of an explicit will to reflect, to say how the world is or seems to be (The world as birth and procreation). But in this sense, the poetry of Oswald de Andrade is also philosophical.
Another philosophical-literary reference of Nascituri is Kierkegaard (especially that of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments), a writer who exhaustively used the infernal resource of perpetual and multi-conductive remission to try to convey his unique philosophy of singularity, which would be rejected by any traditional attempt of exposition. So it is with our subject.
Despite the preface that the reader will find below, the book is not yet in its second edition. It is only, as will be seen, a literary resource. But we hope that this fiction will soon come true. This, on the formal level. On the level of ideas, perhaps the authors aim for the exact opposite: that what is now reality (the irresponsible procreative explosion) becomes, in centuries to come, just an unlikely fiction.
Julio Cabrera and Thiago Lenharo di Santis.
PREFACE OF THE SECOND EDITION
The following scattered papers (written in the time of electronic computers) were found in the house of the philosopher Julio Cabrera after his suicide (which happened at the beginning of the last century), along with his numerous unpublished works. These texts contain his writings on the forbidden subject of birth and procreation. Already in his Diário de um filósofo no Brasil (Diary of a Philosopher in Brazil), Cabrera had purposely hidden these texts, in the section where he outlined the main lines of his ethical-negative thought, considering them unassimilable to ordinary and prejudiced minds.
His executors found the name of my grandfather, Santiago di Diabolis (also commited suicide, in 2042), written on the cover of one of Cabrera’s unpublished briefcases, and immediately contacted him. It was the dead philosopher’s wish for my grandfather to deal with the editing of these damned papers. It seems that Santiago had been a student of some of the courses of ethics of Cabrera at the beginning of the 21st century, and it seems that together they planned to write a book. For some reason that is difficult to discover, after so much time passed, neither my grandfather nor my father honored Cabrera’s request. Now I intend to do so after generations of indifference and postponement.
The main text of Cabrera and the most organized of all (I ignored many others) is called ABOUT BIRTH AND PROCREATION: IF “TAKING LIFE” POSES MORAL PROBLEMS, WHY WOULD NOT “GIVING LIFE”? It presents basically the line that followed in a course of negative ethics offered to students of the now disappeared University of Goiânia, in the distant years of 2006, at the beginning of the last century. This text, obsessively inspired by the primordial intuition about the disvalue of human life (the primordial flame of all of Cabrera’s ethical-metaphysical thought), presents what he considered the three moral problems of procreation. These texts moved me immediately. As long as I remember, I am entirely sympathetic to the idea of not being born, and I regard it as the most revolutionary idea of all practical philosophy. We can never do anything positive that can measure up to the radicalism of the act of refusal.
I, personally, do not like that I was born, although my life is very pleasurable both in affective and erotic terms, as well as in intellectual and economic, modest but sufficient. In fact, well before reading Cabrera’s texts, I had written my own reflections on the subject in a text called CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE DECISION TO GENERATE A NEW BEING. The coincidence with some of the points raised by Cabrera is astonishing, as if, somehow, we had influenced each other throughout the ages, through the mediation (or omission) of my clumsy grandfather. From this crude point of view, I decided to publish the two texts together, his and mine, to the extent of my economic possibilities (for I am very afraid that these publications have to be self-financed, due to their irritant and absurd character to common philosophical sensitivity).
The first edition of the book was released a few months ago. Something very strange happened at this point. Immediately after the publication of the material, I began to receive letters from an enigmatic correspondent, at the same time fascinated and disgusted by our ideas, and who had scandalously suggested himself as a descendant of the author of Projeto de Ética Negativa (Project of Negative Ethics). The letters kept coming to my mailbox, containing rich comments about my text. This forced me, almost compulsively (because of the openly controversial nature of the correspondence), to respond to the messages with new reflections on birth and procreation, and related themes. The mysterious author of the missives never presented himself, and as time went on I began to doubt his mere existence, as if he were a projection of my own tormented ego. He was married with two children and I had the opportunity to meet his wife very briefly.
One fine day, the letters stopped coming and our dialogue broke off without any explanation, just as abruptly as it had begun. Despite all this, Professor Julius von Kabra (so he signed) never sent his address or made any move to facilitate our meeting. Anyway, in the successive editions, I decided to publish everything together, the classic text of Cabrera, my text, the letters of prof. von Kabra and my replies. The reader will notice some gaps in this epistolary because several letters — mine and his — have been lost or destroyed by me in attacks of anger. I forgot to say that Professor von Kabra also added some footnotes to Cabrera’s text, which I kept in full, although some were pedantic and aggressive. As for the drawings, they were made (according to Professor Kabra’s own statement) by his daughter Érika.
I hope from my heart that the reading of this curious material may be of benefit to everyone, but especially that it will convince the good and enlightened people of this world that the best they can do for their possible children is to keep them indefinitely as possible. Let the mere promise of children serve to bear the suffering of being, without needing to generate more suffering and more being. That the fact that my grandfather and my father did not refrain from procreating (and that I have abstained myself to this day from killing myself) serve at least for this unsuccessful offspring to free someone through the effect of negative literature from the misfortune of being born.
Thiago di Diabolis, Septober of 2121.
Note: When reading the texts of Cabrera, the reader of the 22st century may wonder about some datings. It is worth remembering that in the twentieth century, at the time Cabrera wrote his work, there were only 12 months (January, February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October, November and December). He did not know the calendrical modifications that occurred as a result of the surprising astronomical discoveries of the middle of the 21st century, which forced to add the new three months that we know today (maypril, junaugust and septober).
ABOUT BIRTH AND PROCREATION
(IF “TAKING LIFE” POSES MORAL PROBLEMS, WHY WOULD NOT “GIVING LIFE”?)
Julio Cabrera, 2006
Here it will be developed an idea of procreation already found in Seneca, the classic of negative ethics. There are three lines of a moral problematization of birth: the inconvenience of giving something of bad quality to those who can not refuse it; The possibility of a manipulation that could have been avoided; And the disrespect of the rebuilt autonomy of the unborn. But only the ethical path is blocked: there are many other justifications for procreating. And for killing.
About the immense and unavoidable seriousness of the moral problem of procreation
“Well, well, come on… the moral problem of being born! What is that? You must be kidding! (…) How is it that being born can be judged morally?” And, notwithstanding, that’s what it’s about, my friends, of judging life morally, even if it burdens Nietzsche.
My thought (which had to make its way at the end of the prejudiced twentieth century, at a time when subjects such as euthanasia and suicide were still taboo) aims to show, by means of arguments (it is not just an individual páthos or a literary frivolity) That the ultimate basis of our life (and our morality) cannot be moral, that it is at least amoral and often anti-moral; That living is not something that can be morally justified.
(It was difficult, in this noisy “anti-metaphysical” century, to speak again about an “ultimate basis”, but I believe that this unanimous escape from any kind of “fundamentalism” is one of the most scandalous affirmative maneuvers of this mediocre and without density century that I had the misfortune to live).
In fact, the scandal of the moral philosopher on this subject should already explode in the midst of the most banal everyday. For people often develop dialogues in front of us like the following:
— How many children are you planning to have?
— Ah, many, all we can, within our means. All that God commands. A home full of children is always a party, and I owe it to my wife, who has gone through so many anxieties and sufferings.
— Blessed are you who can have all the children you want. I have problems with sterility, but we are trying to solve it; We also want to have many children, if it’s possible.
And it continues:
— So far we did not want to have children, we did not think it was the right time, because raising a child is expensive, but we did our calculations and now we believe we are in a good position to have them.
— It is good to ponder and see if children will not require a very large decrease in our standard of living, or mean a nuisance in our professions and projects, rather than a benefit.
— I’d like to have a little couple, but if it’s two of the same sex, it’s fine, too.
— Nowadays, by ultrasound, it is possible to know a lot about the baby before it is born. In many countries, you can even buy small movies showing your baby’s movements.
If the reader does not shudder at these types of phrase exchanges, finding them perfectly normal, they will not yet be a suitable reader for the present text. The levity, lightheartedness and even frivolity with which one speaks of “having children”, how many and how they will be, what will be done with them and what is expected of them, and how they can be exhibited already before they are born, points to open and public manipulation that shows how these attitudes are accepted and celebrated by world society. No one questions, everyone not only thinks it’s good, but also praises people who thus express themselves and act accordingly.
But the following text is philosophical because it shudders where no one else does, analyzes and criticizes where no one analyzes or criticizes, as has always been the radical task of philosophy (even if it loses its radicality on a daily basis in the so called “professional philosophy”).
For the previous dialogue could be a twin of the following:
— How many cars are you planning to buy?
— Ah, many, all we can, within our means. All that God permits. A house with many cars is always something very good, and I owe it to my wife, who has had to use public transport for a long time, going through anxieties and sufferings.
— Blessed are you who can buy as many cars as you want. I have problems with my bank credit, but we are trying to solve it; We also want to have more than one car, if it’s possible.
And it continues:
— So far we did not want to have them, because we did not think it was the best time; Because keeping a car is expensive; We did our calculations and now we believe we are in good condition to have it.
— It’s good to ponder and see if having more than one car is not going to cause a very large decrease in our standard of living, or mean a nuisance in our professions and projects, rather than a benefit.
— I would like to have two cars, one of more quality (maybe imported) and another for day-to-day, but if they are two economy cars, that’s fine.
— Nowadays, on several internet sites, it is possible to know a lot about a car even before it is released in the market. In many countries, you can watch small movies showing the characteristics of your car while it moves.
The astonishing naturalness with which these two discourses can be put in parallel shows how far we have come in a strongly manipulative and objectifying attitude in the matter of procreation. But the worst is not this, but the fact that no one finds the slightest problem in this, that manipulation has become totally banal to the point of scandal and shudder before it being seen as something abnormal and unbearable.
In the first dialogue, we also note something along the lines of a “responsible” concern on the part of the future parents: how good of them to worry, that they do not have their children suddenly and thoughtlessly, that they calculate the best moment and the number of children that they want to have, so that they can provide the minimum living conditions. But at no moment does one become aware of the total pragmatism with which these “responsible” calculations are routed, as if it were about the purchase of pieces of furniture. A curious utilitarian and functional responsibility, where the distinction between things and human beings tends to be diluted.
This utilitarian and functional bias is clearly seen in the public policies of procreation. Governments are very concerned about the decline in their economically active population, and they are frightened by a growing population of old retirees and unproductive people. In addition to the empty speeches about “the wonders of life”, procreating people is part of an international business, part of the process of producing useful and efficient commodities, a type of production subject to calculations and predictions like any other.
Many countries, which care little about the “sacred” character of human life in other sectors, are already encouraging people to have more babies. In France, there is an incentive for families to generate a third child (in addition to the regulamented two), through a monthly reward of 960 euros from pregnancy to adolescence, so that the economic problem is not an obstacle.
In addition to the direct manipulation of the parents, there is a social, economic, and political calculation under way, at a planetary level, aiming at ensuring that productivity does not fall below the limits tolerable to the market of lives. “Philosophical” discourses about the “sacredness” of life and its wonders arrive only to close the mercantile and utilitarian circle of the production of human life on the planet, as if what is commercially lacking must also be shown to be “good” .
But it is not good! In the first of the three argumentative lines about the morality of procreation that I develop in this text, I try to show how human life is dark and sinister, incredibly violent, and deeply immoral. (Actually, it shows what is trivial and everyone knows, but it has become important to point and formulate, given the extraordinary power of concealment). Obviously, this aspect of my philosophy goes in the opposite direction to the planetary business of indiscriminate creation of life, in a clearly anti-economic thought. Curiously, the twentieth century celebrated loudly the fall of the metaphysical and theological references of thought, but it continues to speak of the “value of human life”, a concept that was clear in the light of that referential but has now become diffuse and incomprehensible.
The reproduction of these utilitarian speeches about children and cars points to a second line of argument about the morality of procreation, that of manipulation. Just as in the first line I argue in the sense that it is morally indefensible to impose something that has neither sensititive nor moral quality, in this other line, I argue in the sense of being morally indefensible to treat others to goals and purposes that are: extrinsic, familial, or state related purposes (here, of course, lies the heart of the second Kantian formulation of the categorical imperative).
My third line attempts to show that it is morally indefensible to suppose that if the unborn could autonomously give their opinion about their own birth (in a retroactive argument, much used in contemporary bioethics, especially in the issue of abortion), they would certainly say yes, that they wish to be born, without any shadow of a doubt, and would always be against any obstacle placed at their birth if they saw that they would have a chance to live a “healthy and normal life”. I believe that this assumption is reckless and logically goes beyond what the available data allows, for the retroactive experiment is constructed in a partial and biased way, which does not allow a hypothetical “rational agent” to make a thoughtful decision.
To facilitate the reading of the following text, I present here a brief summary of the three lines: (1) To challenge the usual idea that when giving birth to someone, we are giving something “valuable”; (2) To point to the inevitable “manipulation” of the very act of procreation; (3) To problematize the idea that, if someone could opine, they would ask to be born. Each of the three sections of my work deals with one of these lines. In them we already see what we can understand here by “morality”, according to which it is not correct: (1) to give someone something that we consider to be disvaluable; (2) manipulate them; (3) disrespect their autonomy. I believe these three things happen when we procreate. This philosophical result may lead many people to either extend their moral scruples beyond the usual, or to expose clearly and without hypocrisy how little scrupulous they are willing to be, or it could lead to a refutation by the absurdity of their own moral worldview.
My three lines of argument are philosophical and structural. This means that they should not be confused with other anti-procreative lines based on intra-worldly and empirical motives. Some of the reasons given by these other trends are, for example, the following. One should give up having children because: (a) they introduce limitations in our lives, take time out of our lives, hinder the full development of our vocations and interests; (B) they require a large amount of economic investment to be able to sustain them in a respectable way (C) they create distances in the couple, introduce affective disturbances (the man is neglected, etc.); (D) they represent a serious ecological problem; births happen without any kind of control over the planet’s effective possibilities.
In none of these lines does human suffering, the disvalue of life, or the manipulation of the other play any role; On the contrary, as we have seen, it is an issue of strongly utilitarian arguments, where it seems that human life is good, so good that children could (if generated at inopportune moments) harm it, bring problems to individuals or to the species. Life is good, it is children who are not good. My line here is exactly the opposite: there is nothing wrong with the children, but there is something profoundly wrong in human life, which leads to the moral convenience of sparing them what we know to be unpleasant for them, however much it spoils our own pleasure and satisfaction.
Apparently, our affirmative societies and their moral theories are very concerned with the manipulation of human beings. But the preoccupation with manipulation seems unilateral, for it is vehemently denounced in the case of suicide (Kant once said that in suicide the person uses their own body as a means), somewhat less vehemently in the case of homicide (for affirmative societies accept innumerable exceptions of manipulating the life of the other, based on the ideologies of “self-defense” and “security”), and never mentions the obvious and evident manipulation of procreation. So that it does not seem to be manipulation stricto sensu that concerns affirmative societies: the body is disposed as a means both when it is decided to end life as when it is decided to continue it, and one both disposes of the body of others as a means when one decides to end their life as well as (even more) when one decides to procreate them.
People proclaim that “the experience of fatherhood (and motherhood) is extraordinary” and recommend it to all (and denigrate those who have not gone through it). But I wonder: “extraordinary for whom?”. It is certainly extraordinary for the parents. When they say that not only will they be happy and fulfilled with the experience but also their children, they do not realize the unfathomable asymmetry and mismatch between these two experiences, the experience of generating and of being generated. The generated is obliged to accept the experience, to make it good and interesting (and even extraordinary); What other option would they have? This obligation is not present in the parents, where the “extraordinary” character of the experience is part of an immersive and unilateral project. The situations of both parties are incomparable.
Thus, when some reply: “There is no sense in you wanting to show that life is bad; You can not decide for your child; Maybe they like to live”, what does that mean? Of course! In a sense, they are obligated to like! But this “liking” will always be a desperate acceptance. The generated is not in a position of really liking. They could like if they had really chosen. Faced with the fait accompli, they are forced to cling desperately to life. Either they “like” or are destroyed (by a nervous illness, or by the hostility of others).
The present text deals with these issues that are never addressed, until now kept unpublished for fear of reprisals and affirmative revenge, both Christian and Nietzschian (deep down, very similar).
Precisely, I began by saying that my line of reasoning was anti-Nietzschean. I want to finish this introduction by clarifying why, if this is no longer evident¹. For what is at issue here is the attempt of a moral-rational consideration of procreation, of the fact, as it is said, “to give life”, although such “giving” is obscure. To stop seeing procreation as a vital explosion that justifies itself. Screams deafen us, but, after being replaced, we ask ourselves for their reason of being. All this is to say that, as a methodological question, “life as a court of last instance” will not be taken here. I am inviting you to inquire together about a possible moral justification of “having children”.
1: The two references to Kant and this anti-Nietzschean ending show to what extent Cabrera’s ethical thought has always moved within the speculative environment of these two philosophers. He imperatively needs the Kantian notion of morality to build his theoretical edifice. Without it, everything falls apart. To better understand these Kant/Nietzsche crossings, see Julio Cabrera, “Para uma defesa nietzscheana da ética de Kant (à procura do super-homem moral). Uma reflexão semântica” Cadernos Nietzsche, número 6, São Paulo, 1999. (Note from v. Kabra).
It is said that having children is something “natural”. But many things that are morally condemned (such as violence, for example) are “natural”. Throughout the history of ethics, we get tired of listening to moralists saying that we have to resist our “natural” impulses (gluttony, alcohol, drugs, sensitive excesses in general) to be virtuous. The impulse to reproduce can be placed on the same “natural” level as the feeding impulses and the aggressive impulses. Why should they be resisted in the name of moral virtue, and the former not? On the other hand, homosexual conduct has often been condemned due to it being “unnatural”. The moral discourse, according to the winds that run, seems to be on the side of nature or against it. After all, it seems that the notion of “nature” is used fallaciously and unilaterally.
In this text of mine, I will always be concerned with morality, not with what is or is not “natural.” According to the line of reasoning developed here, something “natural” can be morally reprehensible, and something “anti-natural”, morally defensible.
Nietzsche said: “There is only life. There is nothing external to life that can judge it”. But life has created an animal with a big brain and insatiable sexuality (an unfortunate combination!) Capable of morally judging… life itself. Now it’s too late to say, “There’s only life”. For in the midst of this whole life, there is also judgmental life. It is not absurd to judge life through life sufficiently developed to do so. The human being appears in the mature age of life, the age at which it can commit suicide, find its own final judgment through one of its own productions, so that life commits suicide through a way of life, Precisely the human life. This is the decidedly unpopular part of my ethical-negative thought, one in which one has to be careful.
Therefore, the pages that follow should only murmur my thought, with the explicit intention of not being listened to by thousands. Anyone who wants to learn it will have to force their ears. The subject is unpleasant, both to write and, still more, to read, so that the frivolous or very sensitive reader can leave the book and take another book of mine (for example, O Cinema Pensa, which is much more inviting)². For those who want to continue, I wish you good luck and keen senses to hear whispers and read small letters. I would like to have a forecast of the repercussion of my ideas in the coming centuries (say, in the years 2100 or 2200), because of the twentieth century I can not expect anything. But I am also glad to be close to my suicide and thus not having to face the anger or sympathies of my future readers. I would like this text to speak for itself, and for people to realize that it is not a literary joke or a supreme frivolity. Human life is a terrible thing, and giving birth to someone is one of the acts that are most loaded with responsibilities and consequences that I can imagine.
2: This split of Cabrera’s work is very curious: on the one hand, his gloomy ethical-negative point of view, with his unpleasant metaphysics of life; on the other, his festive studies on logopathy, concept-images and philosophy of cinema, in his books O Cinema Pensa (Rocco, Rio de Janeiro, 2006) and De Hitchcock a Greenaway pela história da filosofia (Nankin, São Paulo, 2007). It seems to be the work of two different authors, which perhaps points unequivocally to the schizoid character of our philosopher’s work (and perhaps of the philosopher himself).
I. “IF ONE GOES TO SYRACUSE…”
(first moral argument against procreation)
1. From the meaning to the value of being
Heidegger inquires about the meaning of being, making sure not to pronounce on its value. On the contrary, it is the value of being that interests me here especially. I even believe that Heidegger and the Heideggerians have little to do with the meaning of being without going through the question of its value, that we do not visualize the ontology without valuing it. For the human being is a being who values, who in his treading in the world, (in a Sartrian way of saying) makes value holes. It’s this valuing being, “value-hole-maker”, who asks himself about the meaning of being. Can he say the meaning of being, except through his compulsive and inevitable hole making?
But in raising the problem of the meaning of being, Heidegger invites us to think of the “ontological difference”, the difference between being and entity, and to this invitation I respond willingly, for I also need this difference to reflect on the value of being. This difference is crucial to an existential ethics, and specifically to the question of the value of human life (the only one I will deal with here: I will not say anything about the value of the life of giraffes).
For all that is usually said about the value of life is, it seems to me, about intra-wordly entities, and not about its very being. The usual “good life” ideas refer to ontic elements (of entities) of lives, all the “valuable” of a human life is situated in the ontic dimension.
I will try to joyfully lead them to the idea that, ontologically (in regard to being) life is not “good”. Also closing the door to their friend, the agnostic, who proclaims that human life is neither “good nor bad”.
2. Small modern enigma
For a long time it was thought that human life was good in its own being. But this idea became puzzling once the religious and metaphysical references that supported it had fallen. We can always determine the value of a human in relation to something determined: as a teacher, as a dentist, as a soldier. But we have no idea what it means to see it as “valuable in itself”, by the fact that it is human. Of course, human beings place great value on themselves, besides the fact of being teachers or soldiers, and even besides being good teachers or good soldiers. But murderers, liars, and traitors also value themselves. It is easy to value oneself. Does our “value in itself” come only from our own self-valuation? (And could not this great value that we give ourselves be a reflection of the deep awareness of a great fundamental disvalue? Why should we “give value” to something that already has it?).
If, when people say that life is valuable, they mean that we make it valuable through our “hole-making” valuations, well then, we are in agreement. But it seems philosophically relevant to note that valuations can be strongly induced by a basic and fundamental disvalue, a disvalue from which we seek to distance ourselves through our valuations. So that they would be proving precisely the opposite of a “value of life” in itself, in its own being, to the extent that it needs our efforts to become valuable.
What the propagandists of “Life is good” should then say is: it is always possible to make life good, even if it is not good in itself. Human efforts should be included in the assessment. But my three lines tend to put a veil of suspicion on this possibility. I think that life is not good in itself, and that it does not become good without high prices being paid. Usually (as we will see below) we do not realize how much pain and immorality are necessary to carry out this struggle. For in it I must give (I am obliged to give) an enormous value to myself to the detriment of others. The excessive value given to myself is a kind of compensation for the structural disvalue that was given to me at birth.
3. Desperate to live
It is also said that the value of life is proved by the intensity with which each of us seeks to preserve it. But the longing to cling to something does not prove that this something is valuable in itself. Rather than “love of life” as something “valuable”, existence seems more like an immense “thirst to live”, something whose value is doubtful (thirst is valuable?), And which may be anxiously sought by total lack of alternatives. Maybe even a “desperation to live”, something that despairs, not something we can “love”. The “arguments” in favor of “love for life”, based on the fact that people cling desperately to life, seem to be arguments of despair, not arguments of love.
In fact, one does not “like” life, but of oneself in life, the challenge and the fight against the recognized poor quality of life. It is the struggle and the possible dominance over this poor quality of life which, after all, is attractive and interesting, as a challenging game. the beautiful is not life, but we ourselves fighting against its ugliness.
One has to understand this paradox: since life is deeply disvaluable, one tries to “live it intensely”; because life makes one desperate, one tries to live it desperately, of desperately wanting to live. Being desperate to live does not mean that life has value: on the contrary, that which forces us to a desperate acceptance does not have much value.
One lives in the desperation to live, and not in the beautiful, the joy or the love. Only something that can not be freely loved needs to demand this compulsive and unconditional adherence. To live intensely is to desperately hide the disvalue of life.
4. The ontological difference in negative record
Philosophers have made a distinction between two types of “value” of life, a sensitive value and a moral value. Something could have sensitive value and have no moral value, or something could have no sensitive value, but deserve moral value. In the task of pondering the value of human life, we must therefore inquire into this double record. But at the same time, this inquiry must be pervaded by the ontological difference: does human life have a sensitive or moral value in its own being (in its emergence), or only in its intra-worldly characteristics?
Differentiating being and entity, we accept the apparent absurdity of being able to say that human life has a sensitive and moral value in the plane of entities without granting it this value in its own being, or vice versa. (See, later, the text “The genetic difference”). (For an analytic philosophize, for which being is reduced to an extensive group of entities, none of this makes the slightest sense. It is already known that what differentiates and opposes analytic and non-analytical philosophies is the recognition or not of the ontological difference.)
Many people and many philosophers (like William James) have already said that life is good in its being despite particular misfortunes³. Why can not we reverse this and say that life may be bad in its being despite particular joys?
5. You only die twice
In order to evaluate the being of life itself, is it not necessary to introduce the issue of its mortality? But attention: I distinguish between “death” and “mortality”, precisely as a way of making the ontological difference (which I call the “thanatic difference”). I distinguish between punctual death (PD) and structural death (SD). The first is the death that will happen to everyone some day (or some night); the second, death that has already begun to walk from our birth, the decay, the languishment, the dissolution. (Because of that, more recently, I am calling “terminality” to what I am presenting here as “mortality”). According to SD, life and death are therefore internally linked, or terminally linked because PD would be the simple consummation of what was given at birth. To this internal link I call mortality, to distinguish it from mere death (PD).
3: It is possible that this is a reference to the book The Will to Believe, of William James, and especially to the article titled Is Life worth living? Included in this work. There are few allusions to this philosopher in Cabrera’s texts, which he considered the most existential of pragmatist philosophers. There are more affinities of negative philosophy with the sombre novels of Henry James, such as The Turn of the Screw and The Aspern Papers, than with the philosophy of his brother William.
Mortality is linked more to birth than to death. Many ancient writers already had the intuition of the “thanatic difference”, among them, perhaps the most clear and current is Seneca (in works like Ad Marciam De consolatione, De Consolatione ad Polybium and Epistulae morales ad Lucilium).
The being of human life is “to have emerged-mortal”, is to decay, to languish, to die. All human actions seem to move, on the ontic plane, in the opposite direction of this decay. “Hole-making” values seem to delay and endlessly postpone the mortal-emergence of being in its final consummation. The being of human life is to have arisen as a force contrary to the internal terminality of being: the human being decays, languishes and dies in the sense of doing all this in an opposing, reactive, fugitive way, as if the being given to him could not be lived in its positivity, but always negatively, reactively, creatively. But the terminality of being will eventually occupy all the creative space, swallowing the “mortal-being” that decays, languishes and dies. In its place will appear the hole that constituted it from the beginning and that only now became evident.
Here it is outlined a possible judgment of the value of human life in its being: a life of languishing, against which we are compulsively forced to defend ourselves, in a game that we know we are going to lose, can be seen as sensitively bad for a human being, even though the values produced intra-worldly are good, precisely in the sense that they are the postponement of something lived primarily as bad. Thus life is not seen as bad by containing these or those intra-worldly bads, but in its own mortal-emergency lived in flight and defeat.
6. My little 65 years old child
Thus, when you generate a child, you generate a mortal. You put someone in mortality. In this way, it is contestable that something is “given” to them without something being “taken” from them at the same time. (Generally, parents imagine their fatherhood in relation to small, graceful children. But a 83 year old father may have a 65 year old child, at which point he may be able to clearly visualize the mortality of his child, present since the beginning).
7. If dying is bad, then having been born is bad.
That human life is sensitively bad in its being can not depend on any intra-worldy element reputed to be bad. For the intra-worldy goods themselves are pervaded by the mortality (terminality) of being (SD). Being born is bad, from the ontological perspective, because we have been placed in the process of mortality, regardless of what happens ontically inside of it. (Here is an unpopular thought that has always brought me many problems)⁴.
4: We will never know what he is referring to here. We only know the short letter from Editora Vozes rejecting the publication of Project of Negative Ethics, in the late 80’s of the twentieth century. Apart from this, one can see Cabrera’s powerful self-censorship when he dealt with these matters, as if he was aware of his unbelievable character, or the difficulty of defending such ideas against all existing values.
There is no important philosophical difference between being born (SD) and having to die (PD), for birth is ontologically terminal, even though it is ontically initial (and is what is “celebrated” in births, a moment of utmost forgetfulness of being). It is absurd to say that being born is good, but having to die is bad, because being born is the same as having to die, since we can not be born non-mortally. If dying is bad, having been “born-mortally” must be bad as well.
Human life would not be bad by its eventual intra-worldly bad contents (which alternate with the good ones), but by its internal relation with the mortality of the mortal-emergence of being. Whatever we do in this environment will be sucked by the mortal origin of being, all the life we can build will inevitably be mortality, death postponed (in which nothing prevents from there being lights and exaltations).
8. Slow death
Mortality is not only death, but the rubbing, the friction, the attrition, the deterioration, the pain. Thus, human life is not sensitively bad only by PD, for we could erase ourselves calmly and death be an exaltation, an aesthetic apotheosis, an angelic blur, a breath, a fresh breeze. But mortality is consumed constantly in pain, the consummation involves as much pain and friction as birth. Dying, after all, is not so easy (refraining from procreating is easier).
Not only does pain keep us cornered, but its mere possibility always accompanies and frightens us. But when the pain has already manifested itself effectively, the agnostic (frustrated stoic philosopher) seems singularly cruel when he says, for example, that the unbearable suffering of the terminally ill “is neither good nor bad”.
That human life is sensitively bad in its own being seems trivially demonstrable (a triviality that becomes, paradoxically, important due to the mechanisms that persistently hide it). A world where we need to be stoic does not seem to be a good world. In the agnostic assertion that life “is neither good nor bad”, is it not conceded that it is bad? (For if life were really good, would there still be agnostics)? (Agnosticism as a consolation).
9. From the sensitive to the moral: life is not beautiful
Beings constituted like humans can not live these radical facts positively, with joy, rejoicing or approval (perhaps only the eschatological characters of ZOO, by Peter Greenaway)⁵. They can only become accustomed, resigned, being that in resigning oneself one reveals the disvalue (for what sense would it have to “resign oneself” to something good?).
But the sufferings of the mortality of being are not only sensitive (to pain) but also moral, insofar as mortality devours our best intentions to be considerate towards other humans (and animals). The mortality of being closes the spaces of moral consideration, turns us into defensive, aggressive, elusive, distrustful and shrewd beings, not because we are “bad”, but simply to survive (or simply to live). This is what I call “moral disqualification” in my books. Concern for existence makes us insecure and petty, unwilling to listen, anxious and expansive, always cornered by the short time and the scarcity of opportunities (not only the anxiety but also the boredom of existence leads to disqualification).
5: This was, it seems, one of Cabrera’s favorite directors, devoting several studies to him in the book De Hitchcock a Greenaway…, mentioned before. It seems that his favorite “Greenaway” were The Baby of Mâcon and The Pillow Book, which is not surprising.
There is, therefore, an internal link between sensitive suffering and disqualification, for the former is closing the spaces of morality until, in supreme pain, we are no longer in a position to consider others. Decidedly, we can not be moral with all humans, in all circumstances, at all times and in all moments: even the statistics are against us. Not only in the “great crimes of humanity”, but in our most familiar everyday. Trying to be honest can be dangerous for our survival. A certain degree of insensitivity and disregard is simply demanded of us to remain alive.
The damages that some humans can cause to others surpass in cruelty and persistence those caused by nature, by diseases, etc. That is, moral wickedness can surpass sensitive wickedness. (Recall Hume’s text in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section I, where he suggests that one condemned to death could hope to attain freedom by breaking the iron or wood of the scaffold than by hope of changing the stern will of the executioners).
Thus when the preachers of the “good life” say that the consideration of the value of human life should not be limited to the given (our condition of languishing, having been placed in a body that decays rapidly), but should also include the intra-worldy invention of values, the creative reactions, I respond: besides being part of our anguish the fact that we are compulsively forced to react against everything that, from birth, threatens us with the certainty of final defeat, it is totally impossible to create our values without harming (or even destroying) other valuation projects, those of other beings as “desperate to live” as we are.
10. Negative inviolability
A nuance of my ethical-negative thought that has never been well understood is that the sensitive and moral disvalue of human life provides us with what I call a “negative inviolability”: no one has the right to harm, offend or eliminate human life, unless one’s own⁶. The usual affirmative prejudice stipulates that only something valuable can be inviolable. Being life disvaluable in its being, how is it understood that it is inviolable?
But it is truly inviolable in its own being (even though it may be ontically violable in special circumstances), inasmuch as we are all equally affected by the mortal structure of being, so that none of us is worth more than another. It could be said that we are all worth exactly the same, that is: nothing! We are equal in zero, not in a great number, as affirmative thought believes. To constitute the notion of inviolability we only need the notion of equality, and we have it: a negative equality. We are equated by the structural disvalue of our being.
That is why, in negative ethics, we can not kill (a coincidence with the Christian decalogue that my Nietzschean friends do not forgive). The negative inviolability, in any case, is good for those who are already here, but it does not make sense to create someone to have it.
6: Cf. Cabrera Julio, Crítica de la moral afirmativa, Parte IV, 2, p. 198.
11. Some days it rains, in others there’s sun
In general, when I spoke of an ontological-structural disvalue of human life in the marketplace (including the university market square), angry voices were raised, claiming that life is not only pain but also pleasure. It’s what call the “back-and-forth argument” (“There is everything in life, there are good things and bad things”).
But this is not correct! There is no pleasure in the terminal structure of being. How could there be pleasure in decaying, in languishing, in ending, in suffering one’s own corruption, physical and mental decay? What is meant (and I have never denied it) is that humans create in the intra-world values and gratifications capable of counterbalancing the mortal structure of being, and it is in this context where arises (or rather, can arise if we are lucky) pleasure (and possibly at the expense of others’ pain). Every human life is an attempt to balance the secure mortal structure of being and insecure pleasures and intra-wordly accomplishments.
12. Delicate Equilibrium
People (including philosophers, without exception) systematically confuse two levels of appreciation of the value of human life: the level in which the disvalue of the structure is understood, and the level in which we see the possibly fortunate equilibrium (always unstable) between the disvalue of the ontological structure of life (its terminality initiated at birth) and the values (possibly extraordinary, exciting, intoxicating, but also threatening to the projects of others) created in the intra-world. It is possible, having a bit of luck, to “carry forward” a pleasant and fulfilled life, managing to balance the structural disvalue of being with that which we can obtain from the intra-world. But it is inevitable to pay the bill, or to make others pay.
13. Happiness always mediated
Thus, when someone says: “I am happy”, I interpret that they elliptically mean something like: “Through procedures, attitudes, strategies, occultations, redefinitions, forgetfulness, insensitivities, lack of scruples, cruelties and pieces of humor, I was able to balance in an ever unstable manner the pressure of the mortal structure of my being with what the intra-world offers to me in terms of pleasure and fulfillment”.
“Happiness” does not have this “immediacy” that is usually attributed to it: it is a complex construction.
14. Little to offer
In the light of the traditional idea of a “value of human life”, creating people is usually justified in terms of enjoying “intra-wordly goods” even acknowledging the existence of “intra-worldly evils” (the “back-and-forth” argument). This is quickly confused with an appreciation of the very being of life. It is morally justified to procreate on the idea of being morally good to give someone the possibility of enjoying something that is considered valuable. This would follow, consequently, the moral problematicity of abstention, since one would be depriving someone of something that we know to be a good.
The problematic character of these beliefs is muffled by the ontic bombardment to which we have subjected the being of life since our dedicated intra-wordly trench. The rational calculation of procreation is, to say the least, delicate. We have, in fact, little to offer to the one who is born (nascituri te salutant), the fragile equipment for them to try to construct values in a world that opposes them. Is it worth to bother someone in their pure nothingness to put them by force in such a task?
15. Ontic optimist, ontologic pessimist
One could be intensely happy and fulfilled in the intra-world (having succeeded in balancing the mortal structure of being and the intra-wordly realization of values) and at the same time consider a catastrophe to have been born (that is, to have received the mortal structure of being).
16. I give birth to them, and then they “will have to manage on their own”
From a strict moral point of view, the procreator’s calculation about the balance between intra-wordly goods and bads and the structural fact of mortality seems hardly justifiable — concluding as a final result that it is better to procreate, since presumably the offspring will be able to “manage on their own”.
Compare with the following calculation: “I admit that I sent X to a war in which they would certainly die. But I argued this way: up until reaching the center of danger, X will experience many pleasant things, will know many people and things which will give them satisfaction. I could have not sent them to this place, and X would not, thus, be exposed to certain death. But I sent them anyway, because it seemed to me that it was worth it for them to live all that, even when pain and suffering awaited them at the end, and I knew it. X was always very smart and I knew they would manage on their own”.
This argument seems morally problematic. And there is still an aggravation in the case of procreation when compared to these other cases: in all of them, the person is already alive, and by the knowledge we have of them, we can presume that they will “manage on their own”. In procreation, it is the very being of the person that we are constituting, it is the very mechanism of “managing on their own” what we are manufacturing.
17. If one goes to Syracuse…
In De Consolatione ad Marciam, Seneca had already utilized the metaphor of the “problematic travel” to refer to the moral issue of procreation, in the context of a consolatory speech adressed to a woman who had recently lost a child: “Who denies that it is sad? But it is human: for this we were begotten, to lose, to die, to wait, to fear; to disturb ourselves and others, to fear and desire death, and what is worst of all, to never know what our condition is (Seneca’s Consolations). And after that: “If someone said to whom left to Syracuse: ‘know beforehand all the inconveniences, all the satisfactions of your future trip, then embark. Those are the things that you will be able to admire”‘.
In the continuation, Seneca describes the beauties of Syracuse, the island, the sea, the Charybdis vortex, the fountain of Aretusa, the port, etc. “But when you have known all these things, a heavy and harmful summer will destroy the benefits of the winter climate; there will be the tyrant Dionysus, destruction of liberty, justice, laws (…) Some will be burned, others will be beaten, others will be beheaded because of a slight offense (…)”.
And Seneca will outline the alternative: “You have heard what can attract you, what can repel you; therefore, either leave or remain”. After this warning, if someone declared that they wanted to enter Syracuse, could they rightly complain of someone other than themselves, since they did not fall into such a situation by chance, but came voluntarily and conscientiously?”
18. Better not to embark
Obviously, unlike the Syracuse traveler, in the case of birth, the traveler himself does not have the possibility to decide whether to travel or not. That is why the vital (or mortal) problem here is not birth, but procreation. It’s not a moral problem for the children, but for the parents (or for all humans as parents).
This is how Seneca sees it when he invites Marcia to use this image for “the entrance into life in general”, imagining that someone should be advised at the moment of birth, showing them first the high things, and then the harmful ones: “But in this place there will be thousands of plagues of body and soul, wars, robberies, poisons, shipwrecks, unbalance of the climate and the body, premature loss of loved ones and death that is uncertain whether it will be sweet or will come amid suffering and torment. Deliberate within yourself and ponder what you wish ‘(…)’ You will answer that you want to live, why not? ‘(…)’ No one, you tell me, consulted us. Our parents were consulted about us, who, knowing the conditions of life, brought it to us” (53).
Note that the calamities mentioned by Seneca are all structural in the sense in which I use the term. All of them are perfectly known by the people who are procreating. The weeping of those who cruelly lose their children is, according to Seneca, unjustified, since, strictly speaking, they never had what they now believe they have lost. Little reason to embark: better not go to Syracuse!
19. Everyone knows
I believe that the sensitive and moral disvalue of human life is something that everyone in one way or another recognizes. Including the philosophers.
The strength of religions, the ever-pursued promise of other worlds, other lives, eternal life, life without pain; the enormous editorial success of self-help books, psychological offices full of patients, the use of drugs, the creation, through art, of fantastic worlds, populated by heroes, wonderful lands and meanings… does all this not show that human beings suffer in their shaken skins the disvalue of life, in spite of the pleasures of the intra-world, or in contrast to them, pleasures that never seem sufficient to counterbalance the terrible anxiety of being (anxiety always confused with “love of life”)?
Does this not show that the usual discourse on “goodness” and “beauty” of life is a parallel construction to these primordial experiences of disvalue?
20. Dead and Invalid
The dead and invalid also highlight the disvalue of human life. In the case of the former, in the speed and suitability with which we forget them, as if no dead were able to prevent that “life continues”, that he be re-evaluated and easily replaced. Was he so valuable that he does not stop us from continuing, laughing, doing projects without him? If humans were really valuable, should they not be unforgettable and insurmountable? In the case of invalids, the disvalue manifests itself in the expectations of the “useful life” given to the invalids (blind, paralytic, etc.), trying to show them that, after all, living with a disability is not so different from living without it. The valuation of the disabled ends up being a devaluation of the “normal” person. Life is always hard and insufficient, one seems to say to the invalids; we are all disabled; You do not have much to regret…
21. Life always as a means, never as an end
Moral philosophers often admit that it is not mere living what is valuable (mere being there), but what one does with life. One sees the miserable life of one who, by his economic or mental conditions, is obliged to only survive, to only live, to feed, to last, to remain alive.
Does this not show that the moral philosopher has always realized that there is no intrinsic positive value in the fact of being, since all positive values come from the intra-world? And the fact that, left to mere “being”, humans are given over to deterioration, corruption, decay and failure? Does it not show that mere being is disvalued, that it is necessary to fill it with the values of the intra-world so that it acquires some positive value?
(Did not the Alcatraz torturers know this very well when they simply left someone inside a small cell for weeks, with absolutely nothing to do, with no intra-wordly object to distract themselves, simply with their being? If the pure being was good, why being alone with it would constitute the greatest of imaginable tortures?).
22. They are not let to fail
The immense majority of humanity (the “excluded” of Enrique Dussel⁷) is not in a social position to perceive the structural disvalue of being. Their ontically painful situation makes them believe, until death, that their evils are social, contingent, and preventable. Indeed, as Dussel sees it well on his own terms, they are victims of radical disregard by other humans, who by ontic vicissitudes have seized wealth and power, and submit immense masses of other humans to their desires and wills.
For the excluded, the world still appears as something valuable, since from the deprivation of the most fundamental, food, clothing, housing, etc they appear in a horizon of desire that makes them marvelous, when, in reality, in a normal and just situation, it would simply be the elementary to be able to continue (let’s not say “to live well”).
The excluded are thrown into an error of perception of the world, which is the ontological component of their exclusion and exploitation. They are excluded from the view of the mortal (terminal) structure of being, preserved from it by being sunk in the intra-world that requires them in an absorbing and exclusive way: hungry and without time for being.
It is as if the structural disvalue of being was set at level zero, while the excluded are forcibly inserted at the level below zero, at the negative numbers from which zero is seen as positive and desirable. Reaching zero is the ultimate aspiration of the dispossessed, that is, of the majority of mankind. If human life is always an ontological failure, the excluded are those who are not even given the chance to fail.
7: Interesting Argentine philosopher, living in Mexico after a bombing attack in his home country, creator of the ethics of latin american liberation. He maintained with Cabrera a polemic on the subject of suicide in the context of an ethical-political discussion more than a century ago. Cf. Cabrera Julio, “Dussel y el suicidio. Revista Dianoia, Mexico, Maio 2004.
23. Negative justice
Structural pessimism, the view of the basic disvalue, is a class luxury, out of which most of humanity is excluded. For them, ontic evils are more than enough. In fact, the excluded suffer structural disvalue directly (for example, in the proliferation of illnesses, in submission to police forces, etc.). The dominant have the conditions to place intra-worldy bulkheads between them and the mortal structure of being, while the excluded are directly exposed to it (and indeed they are part of the protective shield of the dominant). Liberation must also include the misfortune to which every human being has a right: to not condemn the poor to all sorts of deprived joys. To not deprive them of their negative patrimony.
24. This world is bad and there is no other
In all of western philosophical literature, from at least Hesiod’s Works and Days to Schopenhauer, we can read with exultant pleasure a profuse and rich description of the disvalue of human life. But this occurred while there was another world to escape (still in layman, transcendental or dialectical versions). When this other world fell, when God died, when all transcendences were challenged and the world became disenchanted, it disappeared, as if by magic, that nihilistic discourse, and the discourses of the world (with Nietzsche leading the way) appeared: since there is no other, we will have to learn to appreciate this world.
But all the nihilistic content of traditional and modern philosophy seems to me to be strictly true, independent of its religious or comforting envelope. What has been interpreted in terms of sin, fall, perdition and redemption, ends up being a faithful description of the world in its immanent disvalue. Only something very bad could be historicized and presented as fall, error, atonement, and guilt. Now we know that the world is bad, but that there is no other, neither no one who is guilty of it, that we did not “fall” into the world for some sin, but that we have always been “fallen” or, rather, the world “fell” upon us.
25. To say yes to life (like Nietzsche) is not to ascribe value to it
The affirmative acceptance of life “despite everything” does not prove its structural value, but only manifests a vital attitude (that of Nietzsche, the acceptance of life “with all its terrors”) that ratifies the negative analysis of the structure (already in the expressions “despite everything”, “terrors”).
The “saying yes” to the structure does not have, in itself, any element that proves the structural value of life. We can say yes to anything, including the most obnoxious and terrifying things, to what has no value.
Here it is about description, not about attitudes. And, on the other hand, already at the center of maximum pain, one can not continue saying yes to life “despite everything”. For in this case, I myself become the “sorrow” of living: accepting the structure “despite everything” transforms itself into accepting it “in spite of myself”, something that I can no longer afford.
When Nietzsche saw himself in these circumstances, he chose madness.
26. Despite everything: everything weighs
If, as the affirmatives say, “life, despite everything, is good”, they acknowledge that “everything” must be bad, for something can not be good in spite of something without that something not being bad. If not, it would be good because of (and not in spite of). If life is good despite everything, it means that life is bad by virtue of everything.
27. Opportune ambiguity of the expression “without value”
Of the many times I have tried to show what I once called the “absence of value” of human life, I have heard this surprising reply: “But ‘lack of value’ does not imply ‘disvalue’; if something is ‘absent of value’ then it is neither good nor bad”.
But of course I use the term “lack of value” in the sense of “disvalue”, as when I say to a student: “Look, your work has no value” to mean that the work is very bad, not that I will not evaluate it.
To say that human life is worth zero is not to say that we will not assign it any value, but that we assign it zero or some number below zero, which is a negative evaluation and not the refusal of an evaluation. Assigning nothing is not the same as not assigning.
The affirmative despair bets on the thin thread that separates a “non-value” from a “no value” a De Re denial of another De Dicto. As if, in the face of the conviction of the problematicity of the world, they still wager on a reassuring agnosticism: that the world has no value does not follow that it has non-value. But it is obvious that to have no value means that it is worth nothing, and not that one suspends judgment.
28. Transition to the second argument
The lack of structural value of human life constitutes a clear motive for refraining from procreating. But in procreating, generators not only sink their children into disvalue without any scruple, but also use them as a strategy of concealing their own disvalue. For to generate more and more beings is a way of suggesting the idea that, after all, there is some being to be lived. Something that seems to start (and start something radically new, in the idea of Hannah Arendt) strongly hides the constitutive terminality of being. So the children are, ab initio, doubly manipulated. And of manipulation we are going to speak now.
II. CHILDREN: WAYS TO USE
(Second moral argument against procreation)
29. Your children? But of whom?
There is another very expressive line to insist on the moral problematicity of procreation. It does not pass through the disvalue of life, but comes from the fundamental ethical articulation (FEA) itself as an imperative of the consideration of the interests of the other, besides my own. Herein follows the spirit and letter of the famous second formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative. To use others as a means to one’s goals and purposes may be, in the tradition of modern ethical thought, the very paradigm of disregard, even if one does not get to the extreme of crude manipulation.
The use of the other as a means is very clear in many cases of procreation: children to overcome marital crisis, or as weapons of the crisis itself (children of divorced parents placed in situations of traumatic choices, blackmail and espionage), or to fill the void of lives that “lost their meaning”, to take care of parents in their old age, to claim or prove something to others, to be heirs to a throne, to be the new owners of a large company, or simply to “do what I did not do”.
30. Objects of exhibition
By making a phenomenology of speeches and attitudes, one can see in any case (even in those not framed in the situations described above) behaviors of exhibition of the one who was born, displaying them with pride and ostentation, sometimes with cruelty (for example, to women who can not have children), almost always with celebrations and exaggerations. One can not but shudder at the levity with which this objectification of the one who is born is carried out, as if it were something acquired at a good price. We would not even need elements of “negative ethics” to shudder us: old categories of affirmative morality suffice.
31. Lovely imperfections of children
“During the first nine months there is no sound associated with a specific situation, although the euphoria of the parents attributes approximate or capricious meanings. Sometimes an accidental phoneme is accepted as a nickname of the little one, which is later commented on in parties and embarrasses the addressee, who is obliged to explain in occasions the origin of the surname. It is observed in the principles of learning that although the child gradually ascends to the articulation of the word or to the formulation of the first sentences, the parents descend to the level of language of the child and speak with the little one sometimes imitating their phonemes and their tone of voice, prolonging certain imperfections of language which the guests “find funny” (Thenon Jorge, La Imagen y el Lenguaje, Editorial La Pléyade, Buenos Aires, 1971, p. 81).
All the noise, the enthusiasm, the euphoria surrounding the birth of a child, the way in which they are functionally programmed, the endeavors with which to choose their name, their clothes, their eating and sleeping times, and the ways in which is dedicated to them time and laborious concerns, throughout situations where the baby is displayed, exhibited, where their antics and mistakes cause laughter and charm, all provide an interesting phenomenology of attitudes whose high degree of manipulation is serenely hidden in the rituals of receipt, without feeling the tremendous seriousness of having placed a being in the rough structure of life.
33. The Birth Between Hysterical Excess and Depression
Just as we may wonder what humans think they “lose” when someone dies (the problem of mourning), we can always ask what they think they gain when someone is born. It seems to me that these are the two points of the same illusion, or of two sectors of the same non-being whose absence, paradoxically, humans feel. It is very strange to observe the manifestations of contentment, the screams, the laughter, the jumps, the phone calls, the jokes, the exacerbated comments, the great expense of the body, the long vigil, all that surrounds the birth of a baby. The first idea that comes is that of a strange “excess” because we know that the world only has a reactive value that we have to create permanently, and that this work is hard and inglorious. There is no reason why we should feel happy at births.
Why does an event which should sadden us, or that we should do, at any rate, as a kind of a painful genetic obligation, is accompanied by all this deafening tumult? I believe it is a compensatory and defensive behavior, one of the most typical places of intra-worldly invention of values. The hysteria of birth should be situated between defense and conversion as a way of keeping away the representations associated with unpleasant affections and, at the same time, of dramatizing the psychic conflict in diversified, but always paroxysmal, bodily symptoms. We must suspect this noise so curiously “out of place”, so deeply inadequate.
On the other hand, children born of stumbling, not wanted or loved, not even in hysterical hypocrisy, born to be humiliated and used, despised or treated with indifference, are children of the defect, not of excess, but also manipulated. There is manipulation in both hysterical excess and depressive defect: mothers who love too much, mothers who do not love, all manipulate, for one also manipulates with indifference, even with loving indifference. Warning for depressive mothers: the child has no duty, no compromise, given the unilaterality of procreation. He did not sign anything, he does not owe anything, he does not know anything. The duties of the parents in relation to the children are absolute and asymmetrical: to the absolute right to procreate, so used by humanity, corresponds a total emptying of duties of the other part.
34. Mystification of the Great Mother (Whispered thought)
In our affirmative societies, the non-mother is rejected and slandered, even in cautious and feigned attitudes. The Mother, on the contrary, is celebrated, both in the “sweet waiting” period and after the birth, surrounded by obeisances and attentions.
The baby is visualized exclusively in its undeniable aesthetic dimension (that little, irresistible thing). What should, in any case, be a sober and measured act, becomes an exhibitionist and hysterical paraphernalia, where adults become infantile and the child is objectified.
(As long as we do not have critical mechanisms for this, our morality will be formulated incompletely, for in the structures of motherhood and procreation, other manipulative social attitudes are comprised, as if they provided the general matrix of our relations with others. Not without reason it is spoken of in “maternalism” and “paternalism” to criticize other attitudes that are not directly related to birth and procreation.)⁸.
35. Mystification of the Great Father
When we are very proud of a work (literary, musical, philosophical) that we have just finished or published, and express our immense pride to society, we are often punished for being prideful and arrogant. “Look!” They say, “He thinks he’s a genius! He does not wait for others to praise him; as if he had done a great thing! It’s a shame!”.
8: In this aphorism, we find again that same self-censorship to which I referred in another note. Whispered thoughts (sometimes written in very small letters), pointing to Cabrera’s indecision, as if he wanted, at the same time, to be and not be read. As in Schopenhauer’s case, Cabrera’s relations with his own mother are decisive in understanding his bitter and biased text. In addition, an adequate psychological study may unravel the biographical roots of negative ethics.
However, when one creates a child and manifests his immense pride as a father, society understands, applauds and supports: “Look, a proud father! Of course, who would not be proud with such a beautiful child!”. Curious and annoying that we can not be proud of something that has cost us immense effort to accomplish and which is pure fruit of our most acute sensitivity, and that others allow us to explode of pride only by having successfully exercised our most elemental biological functions, functions that anyone is able to exercise, even if one does not have any talent, even who is, perhaps, the most despicable of humans!
36. All procreation is manipulative
The use we make of the other in procreation is ontological and total, constitutive, in the sense that the very being of the person is being made, and not some intra-wordly element. In the affirmative tradition, it will be said that this is inevitable, since the one who is born can not be consulted. The authoritarianism and asymmetry are inescapable.
But are they? There is no obligation to procreate. If it is possible to abstain, procreation can be morally judged as the use of the other as a means (and even of manipulation), which could always be avoided. If this element of use as a means is general, and does not point to avoidable intra-wordly characteristics, given the avoidable character of procreation, it is not seen how (without reassuming some dogma or axiom about the “sacred value of life”) one could avoid the moral judgment of procreation in general on the basis of the Kantian imperative of non-manipulation.
(Kant himself was inconsistent in not realizing the extent to which his “moral fanaticism” — as Nietzsche had called it — endangers life radically.)
37. Continuing to procreate, but not for moral reasons
All this would not indicate the cessation of reproduction and the end of humanity, but the convenience of accepting that the creation of people happens, in fact, on non-moral grounds. (Possibly pragmatic: so that humanity does not become extinct, for example. But the non-extinction of humanity is not, per se, a moral motive; it can be at best the empirical condition of the development of morality. But nothing prevents us from giving up this empirical motive for moral reasons: humanity could, in a thought experiment, opt for its disappearance on the basis of moral motives.
38. Lost paradise
Against the “Adam and Eve argument”: if they had made use of negative ethics, and had had moral scruples to procreate, then mankind would not have existed. Well, whatever! I’m talking about morality, not survival. Morality could require not to continue living, and survival could be possible only on the basis of immorality (of manipulation and disregard).
So that if Adam and Eve had refrained from procreating, they might have acted morally, even when it had resulted in the non-emergence of mankind (why not think of it as the Great Inaugural Moral Act of humanity, in the shadow of not performing it we live to this day all our miseries?).
39. Create the world to then save it?
In fact, people (even from different social classes) wish to have children and nurture expectations and cravings about the child that is going to be born. So that the arguments that one is being born “for their own good”, so that they may enjoy intra-wordly goods, are not too convincing in the curious paraphernalia surrounding the event of one who is born.
The lower classes seem less hypocritical than the high classes in regard to the procreation of children, though no less cruel and manipulative. Just as it is absurd that God created a world to then “save it” (see my Excursus on Leibniz in the Critique of Affirmative Morality), it seems absurd to put someone in mortality and then do everything to hide it from them.
40. Reductio ad absurdum of morality
There are those who believe that if life itself is morally reprehensible in these two lines (structural disvalue of life and manipulation), if, after all, living is immoral, this would be a kind of ad absurdum proof of the moral point of view of the world. I prefer to follow the lines of argument proposed here to the ultimate consequences. Perhaps it is not morality that is absurd, but life itself. Why not say that morality is the ad absurdum proof of the impossibility of life? If life and morality are opposed, it is not obvious that we should opt for life. Instead of affirming my life, I can negativize my ethics.
41. Love is is not ethical
Love is a vital impulse, not an ethical motive. If it is alleged that one procreates for love, one does not advance a step towards a moral justification of procreation. To say that one has decided for love is to say as much as one has acted by virtue of an irresistible natural impulse. But here we speak of morality, and of a possible moral justification of procreation.
The family is an affective, vital and loving community, not a moral community. When one forms a family, one ends up in a small group capable of protecting them unconditionally: they do not have to be moral to be loved by their family.
(Don’t mothers of murderers say, for example: “I do not care what he has done, he is my child and I will always be by his side”? Don’t corrupt officials justify their robberies and misappropriation of public money by saying that all they did was “out of love for my wife and my children?”).
42. Love and hate
Procreation can not be justified by love, just as heterocide* could not be justified by hatred. There can be as much manipulation in love as in hatred, and it is primarily manipulation that is morally unjustifiable, not hatred. It is better to leave love and hate out of morality (including because, as Freud showed, they convert into each other with incredible ease).
* Translator’s note: this is a word that Cabrera uses in his works to refer to homicide.
43. Children kill parents, after being killed by them
Life, which has been generated asymmetrically and manipulatively, will then attempt to stand in strict opposition to its own generating process, and in this process, as Hegel saw in his lectures of 1803/4, although from another perspective, children become the death of their parents. For a human being does not allow to be eternally manipulated and objectified. As soon as they have the use of reason and initiative, they will open the way to their own autonomy, against all the predictions and plans of their parents, in a project of inevitable and violent claim.
It is structurally inevitable that children try to build their own autonomous self over the remains of what their parents intended to give them. It will be with the remains of this dispossessed being that the child will necessarily make their own formation, generating a real death struggle for autonomy, deep down, by the autonomy which was primitively and originally offended in the very act of procreation, strictly insofar as it could have been avoided.
44. Being born again
In this way, the child now departs for a journey without return, where the opposition to the being imposed on them can not fail to appear as a fundamental component of their true constitution, of their second birth, as if they wanted to free themselves from the manipulation of which they were the object in the first. But this is as impossible as the very morality of procreation: just as parents can not morally justify their procreative act, likewise children wil be infinitely dependent upon it, no matter how audacious their emancipatory and claimant attitudes and gestures may seem. For everything they do to oppose their gestation, they will do so in strict correspondence to the dependency they believe they are overcoming.
45. Against the joyful acceptance of manipulation by the vitalist
It would be possible for a fanatic vitalist to see in all this only the perfectly “natural” oscillations of life. Life is cruel and according to the vitalist, we must accept it fully, with all its cruelty. But I’m not a vitalist, so that I am horrified before manipulation, even when it is “natural”, or precisely because it is.
46. Amoral and immoral
The vitalists say: life can not be judged morally; it is neither moral nor immoral, but pre-moral, or amoral. But this certainly does not apply to a human life. It would be absurd to accuse as immoral an animal or plant who expand innocently; but this innocence is forbidden to man. Procreation does not have the same rate of valuation in animals and humans. Abstention from procreation is not within the reach of animals, nor the significance of procreation or the degree of manipulation it entails. (It is more feasible for animals to commit suicide than to abstain). If morality is defined as the requirement of non-manipulation, then life is based on fundamental immoralities, not on pre-moral practices. (Too early for the gods, too late for the animal).
47. When you can not do anything in life, you make more life
“Having children”, as they say (and pay attention to this terrible use of “having”), is contrary to what is thought, the very patent of the structural disvalue of human life. For children are pure life, simply the continuation of life. Despite what parents have programmed for them, children are not “for” something, they simply are. The parents forget that what they did was simply life, in the difficulty or impossibility of doing something with their own lives.
In a way, the greatest vital nihilism, the greatest conviction of the lack of value of life, is to have children. The human life without value is structured to reproduce indefinitely, pushing the nothingness from parents to children. The children are the confirmation that there is nothing, there was nothing, there will be nothing… only children. The same nothingness now installed in another being; but no, not even another nothingness: the same nothingness in another person, a nothingness that one can now control, objectify, in which one can see their own nothingness from a safe place.
The false (in truth, impossible) continuity of parents in their children is the lack of value of human life, because if it were valuable there would be something to convey through the children, there would be something valuable in children, and not just children. To have children is the very consummation of the disvalue of being, the possibility of moving what is not, what has never been, in other directions.
48. Infinite Dependence on Children
The manipulation of birth continues naturally and fluently in the manipulations of childhood, through the “educational process”. Objectification here is gigantic, both in authoritarian systems as well as in the most “liberal” and “critical” ones. There is something interesting in the Lipman program of philosophy for children: it problematizes the statement that in the presence of a child, only coercion is adequate. This is contested by an ultra-rationalist thesis that the child, despite appearances, is rational, moral, can argue, and so on.
I can accept that the coercion of childhood can be mitigated in this way or another, but not the coercion of birth. Or: I can accept that all the coercion of infancy that is not affiliated with the infinite dependence of the coercion of birth be mitigated. We can answer all the child’s questions, except this one: “Why did you give birth to me?” We trust that the child will never ask this, and if it does, we send it to a good psychologist.
49. We can not be moral towards children
The lack of morality towards young children is an inevitable consequence of the lack of the moral justification of birth, the fruit of a fundamental ethical transgression. Any affirmative argument, any grant of autonomy to the child will be derived, secondary, a disguise of the great founding manipulation.
I do not think that an affirmative solution to this problem is possible. Given the link between childhood and birth, we could have this affirmative solution only if we could obtain proof of the value of life, in which case we would ethically and rationally justify the morality of birth and, therefore, our attitude toward small children. In that case, coercion would be ethically justifiable. But this proof (as we know) is not available and therefore the affirmative exit is closed.
But not the negative exit, which is based on the idea of an infinite manipulative dependence, which starts from birth and expands to infancy… and even adulthood. It is our being that has been chosen in a coercive way, so that it is too late to raise the issue of morality with young children. This morality can only be tragic, an intra-wordly management of the unjustifiable (an unacceptable result for affirmative ethics).
50. Sorry, boy.
Only within a negative ethic can we face the eyes of children. Respect for the child is based on the full recognition of the original moral transgression, largely hidden in affirmative “educational” mechanisms. We should keep the tragic moral responsibility of giving birth to them as a background of our ontic attitude towards children, without disguise or concealment. It is the disvalue of life, the inevitable coercion of birth, the sinking of the child into pain and disqualification, which founds a (negative) morality towards children. We owe the child an ontological excuse.
51. “Stumbling” and morality
Rereading Freud (Psychopathology of Everyday Life) I remember the notion of “stumbling” and “turpitude”, of the disruption of the unconscious, which sometimes (section VIII) connects with self-inflicted harm and suicide. But if this applies to suicide, the thanatic difference leads us to think of the strongly “stumbling” character of procreation, as if all births were ontologically accidental. If nobody wants to die, nobody really likes to be born. The accidental factor pervades all our actions, death is as accidental as birth. This should have an impact on the accusatory moralism of negative ethics: parents are more clumsy than mischievous, and they may have mitigating factors when judged morally.
(Do not think that those who harm us are necessarily
shrewd and wicked; they can be, simply, stupid.
52. The genetic difference⁹
When people (and especially women, and especially mothers) tell me: “You do not like children”, and I reply: “Of course I like them; I do not like parents”, they startle, giggle nervously, move in their chairs, put their little baby in their lap for the thousandth time, and say: “And how are you going to have children without parents? ”
I believe that in this response, women (and, in general, many people) ignore what I call the “genetic difference”, showing the father/child distinction as structurally linked to the being/entity distinction. My idea is that you can reject the pure appearance of children in the world (that is, their being), but once it is produced, you may like the product (that is, of entities) without any contradiction. This is the situation: you would prefer that X not happened, but once it happens, you accept X. In the middle of your acceptance of X, you still insist: it would have been good if non-X. This is what I call “negative retro-preference”. It has the following scheme: “A does not want X; X has a good consequence Y; A likes or accepts Y, but continues to prefer non-X. ” It seems that the antecedent of this idea is already in Seneca (Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, letter 9), where this classic of negative ethics shows that a mutilated person can adapt to their situation and even enjoy some advantages of this condition, but still wish to not have suffered the mutilation.
9: I know that this aphorism is absolutely fundamental in Cabrera’s thought because it left my wife in a state of anger for four days. The spontaneous reaction of a mother can be worth more than 500 arguments of scholars (arguments that the texts of Cabrera do not deserve. In fact, they do not deserve even the wrath of my wife).
“Liking children” is an aesthetic judgment. You may like them even if you would rather they had not been born. I see the child already in their terminality, I love them immensely, and at the same time, I mourn their inexorable decline, their rapid aging. In extremis, I can say: precisely because I like them, because I like them immensely, I wish they had not been born, that they were not here to lose themselves, to stop quickly from being these wonderful children that I love so much.
I like human beings as children, I do not like them as parents. There is no existential contradiction in this, although there seems to be some logical contradiction. (Curious that women, hardly logical in general, become strongly logical at this point, and close their faces in disgust when I say, “I like children, but I do not like parents”, as the formal logician would close their face before an inconsistent set of axioms).
III. TALK TO THEM (People not yet born)
(Third moral argument against procreation)
53. Speaking frankly with whom is thinking about being born
The last line of answer to the moral problem of procreation is the following: we must not procreate, not because the world is bad (first line), nor to avoid manipulation (second), but with respect to the autonomy of the possible being. (This line is not completely independent of the previous two, as we shall see).
To speak of the “autonomy” of a non-being only makes sense if it is reconstructed by means of what in bioethics has been called hypothetical “retroactive arguments”, used, for example, in the case of brainless babies. (“If you were to live without a brain, and you could choose, would you still want to be born?”). Why could we not make retroactive arguments also in the case of non-beings (who not only do not have brains, but have no body or anything)?
(Incidentally, the moral problem of procreation is significantly different from the moral problem of abortion.) By aborting, we already have an existing being at some point in its development process, and no longer a non-being. We kill someone when we abort — this is the famous bioethical polemic — but we can certainly say that we do not kill anyone when we abstain. In its strictly manipulative aspect, abortion is closer to procreation than to abstention: once generated, it is the parents who pragmatically decide if the child is going to live or not. Only metaphorically, abstention could be seen as a kind of radical abortion. Only the resource to the retrospective argument seems clearly common, because both the non-being and the fetus can not speak for themselves — albeit for different reasons — and that is why they have to be “represented”.).
The usual retroactive arguments of bioethics seem to me, in general, to be entirely intra-wordly. My point is that they should also include ontological considerations in these conjectures, and say things such as: “If you could choose, would you accept to live a life in which you are subject to fall ill, suffer, and die at any time?” (Suppose, in the conjecture, we could show them the film Johnny got his gun, by Dalton Trumbo).
These ontological considerations should already apply in the case of the brainless baby. To be born without a brain is the mortality of being manifesting already very early, not needing years to be consummated. From the structural point of view, we could consider any possible being as a potential brainless baby, or as a potential terminal patient: there are no differences between them that are not purely intra-wordly.
An autonomy thus reconstructed, with all the relevant information (ontic and ontological), is something that we should respect. (A non-being needs information). And, based on this autonomy, to think that refraining from procreation is the best way (from a strictly moral point of view).
I said that this line was not completely independent of the others and now I can say why: I refrain from giving birth to someone because they, in full autonomy, would choose not to be born in a disvalued world (first line) where they will be manipulated and forced to manipulate (second line). But is this well thought out?
54. Quality of a rational agent
Would a genuinely rational agent choose to be born? My argument against R. M. Hare can be reread in the Critique of Affirmative Morality (especially on pages 207 et seq), partially repeated in my article A Ética Analítica diante da questão do Nascimento, a Morte e o Valor da Vida Humana (Goiânia, 1997). There I suggest that in the experiment where the non-being is magically consulted about their possible birth, Hare is mistaken in assuming uncritically that “they” would undoubtedly choose to be born. (This is the usual affirmative trend). For let’s suppose that they are human, that is, a rational creature capable of pondering reasons.
The information that is given to this possible being in Hare’s experiment is incomplete and biased. We should also tell them that if they are born, they will have no guarantee of being born without problems; that if they manage to be born without problems, they will almost surely suffer from many intra-wordly evils; that if they manage to get rid of them (and this is intra-wordly possible, even if difficult), we can not give them any guarantee as to the length of their life or the type of death they will have, as well as having to suffer the death of those who they come to love and to have their death suffered by those who love them (if they are lucky enough to love someone and to be loved by someone else, which is also not guaranteed).
They must be told that if they avoid some violent accidental death, they will decay in a rather scarce number of years (as well as the people they love and care about), and that they have a high chance of becoming a terminal patient that can suffer terribly until the time of their demise. If it is still possible for the non-being, after having assimilated all this information, to choose to be born, could we not nourish well-founded doubts about its quality as a “rational agent”?
Hare’s assumption (shared by Thomas Nagel, Peter Singer and others) that “if they could choose, the possible being would undoubtedly choose to be born” is not so trustworthy. The choice should be highly affective and emotional, grounded in some kind of “fear of not being”, or “thirst for being”, and not in reason. But of course, here we reach the limits of Hare’s Gedankenexperiment, since the unborn is not a real being who might be “afraid of not being”, like us who are already here.
55. Being born without the brain or using the brain to not be born?
In fact, by not giving birth to anyone, I follow the same principle of avoidance of pain and moral disqualification that I follow when I do not allow the brainless child to be born or to continue living: when I abstain, among other things, I radically free my possible child even from the possibility of being a brainless child.
In this case I am not deciding for anyone, I am not transgressing any real autonomy, as in procreation. Abstention is more likely to be morally justified in terms of a prior ontological-structural consideration of the available data.
(Of course, we are always talking about structural abstention, which takes into account the suffering of the unborn, and not of intra-wordly abstentions, that could suffer from the same moral problems as procreations: not having children so they do not bother us in our professional life is as manipulative as having them to look after us in old age).
56. Respect for the non-being of others
One may say, “You believe that life is good enough for you to live (because you do not commit suicide), but you do not consider it good enough for others to live (you do not have children)”. I do not think life is good for those who are already alive. Only that they have with the ontological disvalue a different relation from that of the non-living, the possible beings. Life is never good, but the living can keep it within the limits of tolerability. But it does not make sense to give birth to someone for them to keep their life on the edge of tolerability. None of the things I say to myself to “continue” are of any worth for someone who is not yet.
57. Immortality if of no use
It seems that, as Cioran saw it, the radically wrong is to have been born, or simply to be. Not even being immortally would avoid the problem of being.
It is mortality (terminality) the ultimate explanation of why men behave regularly with disregard for each other. And what would change if we were immortal? Perhaps we would not be trapped by a lack of time, and we would be less aggressive, because we would have the good mood of eternity, to say “If I do not do it today, I can do it tomorrow or later”, and “if you want to do it, then do it, and I do it tomorrow, or I will never do it. ”
But one might think that most of the petty things of today would continue to function equally in a world of immortal beings, as it did on Olympus. (Leaving aside that if we were all immortal, paradoxically, life would stagnate, because we would prevent the birth of new immortals, and there would be a single permanent generation.)
As Bernard Shaw shows in his unrepresentable play Back to Methuselah, morality would be profoundly affected by a civilization of immortals, but moral disqualification would only change its shape. The unfeasibility of being crosses the mortal/immortal distinction.
58. Too late!
None of my actions, not even the one that can most radically move towards the protection of the other, can somehow fail to hurt. By living, I already bother. (Levinas has intuitions in this sense, which I knew long after having had them by myself). I am already a being who must abstain. To be wholly moral, I should not be here to abstain or to commit suicide. (“Suicide is no good: it does not erase the fact of having been”, Max Frisch, Voyager.) It could be said: “Procreation is not good: it does not erase the fact of having to be”. Others should have thought of my non-birth. Now it’s too late.
10: “Should I be? Do I murder by existing, by persisting in being? (…) Do I have the right to be? By being in the world, do I take the place of the other? “Emmanuel Levinas. Ética e Infinito, X. Edições 70, Lisboa, 1988, p. 114/5. It is not proven that Cabrera did not take these ideas from the great Lithuanian thinker (who, on the other hand, has a humanistic dimension totally absent in our Argentine-Brazilian philosopher).
59. No way out?
The terrible structure of the world threatens us with the possibility that abstention may also be aggressive and manipulative. Perhaps the situation has no way out, and both when we procreate and when we refrain from procreating, we are equally immoral. For by not giving birth to someone, are we not already deciding for them? Would not abstention also be a manipulation and therefore we will be doomed to manipulate?
Life is inherently mortal, but should we not be against abstention for offending autonomy? Should not each one decide how they prefer to live the mortality of their being and, therefore, would it not be ethical to let them be born and to decide for themselves? To give birth to someone is part of the life project of the parents; but not giving birth to someone does not belong equally to the life project of those who abstain?
A strong conjecture might be: “If the unborn child could choose, they would certainly choose to be born, even though they know they will be placed in the mortal structure of being”. But is this strong conjecture correct? Given the high number of “withdrawals” (suicides, psychoses, neuroses) of humans who did not stand life and gave it back, it does not seem to have much base the idea that, having the relevant information, everyone would choose to be born.
Affirmative thinkers (such as Peter Singer) argue that people would choose to live a healthy and “normal” life, and not live a life of “poor quality”, full of suffering and without possibilities of development. In the ontological-structural perspective assumed by negative ethics, this changes a little: it is not ruled out that, with the relevant information, someone chooses not to live even a healthy and “normal” life, of “good quality”, by the fact that this life is pervaded by the mortality of being, the rubbing, the friction, the deterioration, the pain.
The person who has chosen to be born (in our fantastic Gedankenexperiment) has always opted for the terminality of their being and also for the possibility that their life may turn at any moment into a life of “poor quality”: if the life of a current terminal patient is problematic, why would the life of a future terminal patient not be?
61. Do we have the right to not have children?
But the conjecture might be weakened, and thus: “If the unborn child could choose, they might perhaps choose to be born, even though they know that they will be placed in the mortal structure of being”. Negative ethics can not be insensitive to this possibility: “negative inviolability” (see previous texts) prevents us from taking other people’s lives because they have the same disvalue as ours. What prevents us from applying that to the case of abstention? That is to say: just as we have no right to take a life with the same disvalue as ours, do we have the right to prevent a life that has the same disvalue as ours? (Abstention as a form of heterocide).
I am preventing from being born someone who could choose to come into the world even knowing that they will be placed in the mortality of being. I am, therefore, deciding for them. Do I have this right? (This could lead not only to the convenience of procreation, but to the obligation to do so).
Here is the image of the continuum presented by the conservative lines of bioethics: if it is forbidden to kill adults, it must be forbidden to kill children, because they will become adults; and if it is forbidden to kill children, it must be forbidden to kill fetuses, because the fetuses will become children… etc. At the end of the continuum, it may be said: if it is forbidden to prevent fetuses and embryos from developing, it should be forbidden to prevent possible beings from developing, since possible beings, if not prevented from being, will become embryos, fetuses, children, adults, etc.
62. A possible being does not lack anything
A first line to “tie” the cases of the prevention of life of adults, children and fetuses, on the one hand, and those that prevent the life of a possible being, on the other, would be to point to the fact that, in the case of procreation and of birth, there is no one whose autonomy we are going to injure with the decision to not give them birth, since possible beings have no autonomy. But it can be said that neither fetuses and embryos do, so the argument does not proceed.
It would seem that the appropriate distinction is: being/non-being or, current being/possible being. Existing beings (embryos, fetuses, children) lack autonomy, whereas in relation to possible beings we can not say that they “lack” anything: autonomy does not apply to them, like no other predicate only applicable to current beings. (An existing street may lack light signals, but a non-existent street can not lack them or anything). To lack something, one must be there.
Thus, it is more radical and convincing to say that in the case of the possible being, there is no autonomy to hurt, not only in the sense that they still have no autonomy while being able to have it, but in the sense that they will never have it unless it updates. If there is no autonomy to be offended in this radical sense, then it seems that in the moral consideration of procreation, arguments based on the mortal structure of being should prevail, that is, the reasoning presented in the first section about the delicate balance between the mortal structure of being and intra-worldly values, and the little we have to offer to those who are born.
In the case of the moral prohibition of heterocide the opposite happens: the considerations of autonomy must prevail over the mortal structure of being, because in this case we already have a developed being, with an autonomy to be respected, etc. Although the life of a current being is disvaluable, it is their autonomy that must be met, because they must do with that disvalue what they can or want. Conversely, even if the life of a possible being can become autonomous if they are born and transformed into a current being, it is the disvalue of life (current or possible) that must be attended to, since there is no one who can decide on the disvalue.
63. Limits from the moral point of view
I believe that the hypothetical reconstruction of the autonomy of the other does not work to morally justify the abortion of healthy fetuses: this is heterocide and, therefore, morally unjustifiable. But this does not mean that I am “against abortion” within the current heated controversy on this issue. I may be in favor of abortion for intra-worldly, social, economic reasons, etc, even if I do not justify it morally. My idea is that we can not guide our lives only by moral categories. Thus, from the fact that abortion or procreation is morally unjustifiable, it does not follow that we should position ourselves against the practice of abortion or against procreation.
I believe this is a persistent non-sequitur throughout the history of moral thought: that we are obliged to do what is moral, and forbidden to do the immoral. On the contrary, it can sometimes be rationally convenient to position yourself in favor of something morally unjustifiable (like lying, stealing, killing… or procreating).
64. Generate and destroy
I believe that procreation can not be sustained on moral grounds, but only in pragmatic ones. Nor do I believe that humanity should be guided exclusively, and not even primarily, by moral categories. I believe that human life can only develop by transgressing moral principles (just as it can reason only by transgressing logical principles), that morality is something that nature allowed, in a certain state of evolution, but that the natural being itself that formulates it can not execute it. I believe that to generate and to destroy are two natural impulses that the human being can not tame, and through which life is propelled.
That is why affirmative societies foster procreation and allow the aggression and death of others so loosely. Generative manipulation and destructive manipulation are the pillars of our affirmative society, following in this the habitual primacy of life over morality. Negative ethics is the invitation to think about what human life would be like if the moral principle had primacy over the promotion of vitality.
Do not forget that when one says yes to life, one also says yes to destruction and depredation, without which life could not develop. Perhaps procreation is a form of destruction, and killing (as Jean Genet saw it), a form of construction.
65. Abstention and Suicide
If considered as a form of suicide (the suicide of the species), abstention could circumvent Schopenhauer’s argument that, when one commits suicide, one does not deny the very essence of the world but only its individual phenomenon.
66. An earlier wisdom
Philosophers have always spoken of life as a “preparation for death”, and of philosophy as a “learning to die”. But there is a wisdom before this: to learn to abstain. To not put anyone in the situation of having to learn to die.
[End of the first chapter]